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Can Hypothetical Questions Reveal True Values? 
A Laboratory Comparison of Dichotomous Choice 
and Open-Ended Contingent Values with Auction Values 
Abstract 
Can hypothetical questions reveal true values? An examination of the 
laboratory experimental literature examining contingent valuation (CV) lends some 
support for using open ended hypothetical willingness to pay questions. However, 
experimental studies examining dichotomous choice have found that hypothetical 
answers overstate demand. Consistent with the experimental literature, published 
CV studies comparing open-ended to dichotomous choice questions have shown 
that values from the latter method equal or exceed those of the former in every case. 
This paper presents a series of experiments employing more than 800 subjects to test 
this hypothesis for CV and compares the CV results to actual auction values in a 
single controlled experimental environment. 
-

1. Introduction 
Can hypothetical questions reveal true values? This and many aspects of 
contingent valuation (CV) as a tool for valuing non-market goods are under intense 
investigation. One fundamental question that remains is: how should a 
respondent's value be elicited, with a continuous willingness to pay question, such 
as that provided in an open-ended question (OEQ) format, or with a dichotomous 
choice question (DCQ) given a stated price? This paper describes a laboratory 
experiment which compares willingness to pay (WTP) obtained in an actual auction 
with WTP obtained from both open-ended and dichotomous choice questions, 
between different subjects, for an insurance policy against a financial hazard with a 
known probability. Such an experiment is needed because the NOAA panel on CV 
(Arrow et al., 1993) specifically endorsed the use of dichotomous choice questions. 
One of the major discoveries of experimental economics has been that the 
detailed structure of institutions (including how bids are elicited) matters. In fact, 
theoretical incentive compatibility does not guarantee that a market institution will 
actually reveal demand (see, for example, Kagel and Roth, 1995, pp. 506-508). 
Consistent with this discovery, a review of the CV studies comparing institutions 
using auction like open-ended values with values obtained from posted offer like 
institutions using dichotomous choice, reveals that dichotomous choice almost 
always produces larger value estimates (Schulze et al., 1996). In reviewing the six 
CV studies that have compared values from OE and DC questions they found that 
the average study shows that the elicitation methods differ by a factor of 7.0 and that 
the median study shows a difference of a factor of 1.9. Laboratory experiments, 
-

although never directly comparing OE and DC questions, have shown that OE 
questions can closely approximate auction values (see Coursey et al. 1987, and the 
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study reported in Shogren et al., 1993, and Fox et al., 1994). In contrast, DC questions 
have consistently led to an overestimate of demand in laboratory experiments 
(Cummings et al., 1995 and Cummings et al. forthcoming). 
The remainder of the paper presents a series of experiments testing this 
hypothesis in a consistent experimental environment. First, actual bids are obtained 
from an English auction for an insurance policy protecting the subject against a 0.4 
probability of a $10 loss. Second, open-ended hypothetical bids are obtained from a 
different group of subjects for the same commodity. Third, five different groups of 
subjects, each group facing a different posted price ($1, $4, $6, $8, and $12), are asked a 
dichotomous choice question: would they hypothetically purchase the insurance 
policy? It should be noted that none of the DC laboratory experiments published to 
date have collected sufficient data at more than one price to allow estimation of 
WTP. 
2. A Summary of the Experimental Literature1 
The experimental approach potentially allows the experimenter to obtain true 
values since some auctions have been shown to be demand revealing in 
experimental tests. Experimental tests of auction mechanisms use induced values 
(Smith, 1982) where, for example, subjects may buy or sell tickets redeemable at the 
end of the experiment for the face amount. Since the experimenter knows that a 
subject's true value for the ticket is the face amount, an auction is perfectly demand 
revealing if subjects submit offers to buy or sell their tickets for amounts equal to 
face value. We use the term demand revealing to refer to the actual performance of 
a mechanism and refer to the theoretical property of demand revelation -­
supported by either a dominant strategy or a Nash equilibrium -- as incentive ­
1 This section summarizes, in part, an extensive review of the literature presented in Schulze et al. 
(1996). 
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compatibility. No known auction is perfectly demand revealing since subjects make 
errors even if large sums are involved (Smith and Walker, 1993a, 1993b). However, 
one incentive compatible mechanism, the English auction, is very close to being 
perfectly demand revealing for all subjects except the winner, even on the first 
round (Coppinger, et al., 1980; Kagel et al., 1987; Levin et al., 1996). Some 
theoretically incentive compatible mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction, require 
several rounds of experience before they approach individual demand revelation. 
In fact, although the English and Vickrey auctions are theoretically isomorphic, the 
English auction performs much better in revealing demand (Kagel and Roth, 1995). 
Theoretically incentive compatible mechanisms, such as the Groves and Ledyard, 
Clark, and Tullock public good mechanisms, perform much more poorly than 
private good auctions and require a large number of rounds before subjects approach 
demand revelation even at the average or aggregate level. These mechanisms, in 
spite of their theoretical properties, are not individually demand revealing (Davis 
and Holt, 1993). In contrast, the English auction is individually demand revealing. 
To obtain the most precise estimate of the actual value of the insurance policy used 
in our experiment, based on experimental tests, we employ the English auction. For 
a summary of the literature on the performance of alternative mechanisms see 
Davis and Holt (1993) or Kagel and Roth (1995). 
A number of experiments have examined OE-CV questions. The first 
laboratory experiment to test CV against actual auction behavior (Coursey, et al., 
1987) used a bitter tasting liquid, sucrose octa acetate, as a proxy for an 
environmental commodity. Subjects were asked for a hypothetical OE-WTP to 
avoid a taste experience. After they had tasted the commodity, the same subjects 
submitted bids to avoid the commodity in a uniform price multiple unit version of ­
the Vickrey auction. Mean hypothetical and actual bids were similar in that the 
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ratio of hypothetical to actual auction bids was equal to one.2 A substantial number 
of experiments have followed this general design including studies by Brookshire, et 
al. (1990), McClelland, et al. (1993), Irwin, et al. (1992), Boyce et al. (1989, 1992), Neill 
et al. (1994), Shogren et al. (1994), and Fox et al. (1994). Schulze et al. (1996) 
summarize these studies and conclude that the median experiment shows that 
hypothetical bids exceed experienced market values by a factor of 1.65. They focus on 
the median bias because the distribution of experimental results is highly skewed 
and no one experiment can be viewed as conclusive. For example, focusing only on 
the WTP for a 16th century map obtained by Neill et al. (1994) would lead one to 
conclude that hypothetical values had little predictive power since the ratio of 
hypothetical to actual bids was 9.1. Alternatively, examining the Coursey, et al. 
(1987) study (ratio of 1.0) or the Fox et al (1994) study (ratios of 1.2 and 1.5), which 
value unfamiliar commodities (where one might expect a large bias), would lead 
one to conclude little bias is present. Note that, unlike real world CV studies, large 
hypothetical values (no matter how unrealistic) have not been trimmed from the 
experimental data described in these studies. 
All of the experimental studies described above relied on OE-WTP questions 
for eliciting values. Given the endorsement of the referendum approach (which 
presents respondents with a dichotomous choice question) by the NOAA panel on 
contingent valuation (Arrow et al., 1993), what do laboratory experiments say about 
DC questions? The first laboratory experiment to shed light on the reliability of 
dichotomous choice (Cummings et al., 1995) shows that, for three different 
commodities (a juicer, chocolate candy, and a calculator), respondents in a 
hypothetical setting overestimate the frequency with which they would make an 
actual purchase at the same posted price. Similar results are obtained in a public ­
2 This is an average of a range of estimates which are obtained depending on the treatment of one large 
outlier actual bid. If this bid is included the ratio is 0.7; if it is excluded the ratio is 1.3. 
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good setting as well (Cummings et al., forthcoming). These studies do not estimate 
willingness to pay, but suggest that dichotomous choice may produce upward biased 
estimates of value. 
The Cummings et al. papers are only suggestive because they collect sufficient 
data at only one price to allow statistical testing in both their survey question and 
actual institution and, as a result, cannot estimate WTP for the commodities they 
use for comparison. Since, as we show using five prices, hypothetical and actual 
price elasticities differ, such comparisons may be misleading. In the experiment 
described in this paper, we extend the work of Cummings et al. in four ways. First, 
we obtain a full willingness to pay estimate by using five prices to trace out the 
entire demand curve in the dichotomous choice treatment. Second, we obtain 
hypothetical WTP using both dichotomous choice and open-ended WTP so that the 
two techniques can be compared. Third, we use as the commodity an insurance 
policy with a known expected value. Fourth, we use an English auction to obtain a 
reliable estimate of actual WTP for the insurance policy. 
3. Experimental Desi~n 
3.1 English Auction 
Two English auction experiment sessions were administered in which bids 
were recorded from a total of 52 subjects. The English auction was chosen because it 
is more closely demand revealing than any other mechanism that has been tested. 
As noted above, the mechanism does not reveal the value of the winning subject. 
Thus, since we conducted two sessions, we obtained values for 50 of 52 subjects. 
Subjects were volunteers from undergraduate classes in macro- and microeconomic 
principles at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Subjects were generally 
unaware of the concept of expected value and were not trained in it or related 
concepts. The subjects were seated in a classroom in which the desks were arranged 
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in a circle so that they were in full view of the experimenter and each other. 
Instructions (see Appendix A) and bidding cards were distributed. The bidding cards 
had a green side and a yellow side, and both sides had the subject's number recorded 
on them. After the subjects read the instructions carefully the experimenter gave an 
oral summary, and administered a practice auction to familiarize the subjects with 
the auction mechanism. 
The auction begins with all subjects holding up their bidding cards with the 
green side facing the center of the room. The experimenter announces prices, 
starting at $0.00 and increasing in $0.40 increments. After a price is announced, 
subjects either keep the green side of the card facing the center of the room, 
indicating they wish to remain in the auction, or they flip the card so that the yellow 
side of the card is facing the center of the room, indicating that the current price is 
the maximum they would be willing to pay. The current price is recorded for 
subjects showing the yellow side of their cards; these subjects are not allowed to 
participate further in the auction. The last person whose card's green side is still 
facing the center of the room gets the auctioned commodity at the last announced 
price. 
After the practice auction each subject was g.iven an initial balance of $80, but 
was then faced with a 0.4 probability of a $10 loss. One insurance policy against this 
loss was auctioned in each session. The 0.4 probability was operationalized by 
placing 40 red chips and 60 white chips in a cloth bag and randomly drawing a chip 
from the bag. The purchase price was deducted from the balance of the one subject 
who purchased the insurance policy. After the auction, a volunteer subject drew a 
chip (with replacement) separately for each subject. If a white chip was drawn, a 
subject's balance remained unchanged. If a red chip was drawn, a subject's balance ­
decreased by $10. Subsequently, subjects participated in other auctions against 
different probabilistic losses. The main purpose of these subsequent auctions was to 
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reduce subjects' expected balances to a more reasonable hourly wage rate (about $30). 
The data for these additional auctions are not reported here. 
3.2 Contingent Values 
In order to obtain contingent values that were comparable to the values 
obtained in the English auction, subjects were asked in a survey format to value an 
insurance policy protecting against a hypothetical risk of a 0.4 probability of a $10 
loss. There were two versions of the survey: one used an open-ended question 
(OEQ, Appendix B), and the other used a single dichotomous choice question (DCQ) 
for a fixed price (Appendix C contains the DCQ version for a price of $4; other 
versions were identical except for the price). Different versions of the DCQ survey 
used prices of $1, $4, $6, $8, and $12. 
In the surveys, the risk was described identically to the way it was described in 
the English auction instructions. Thus, respondents are valuing the same 
commodity. Specifically, the surveys asked the respondents to imagine that they 
had an initial balance of $80 and that they faced a one-time loss of $10 with a 0.4 
probability. The loss was to occur if one of the 40 red chips out of 100 (red and white 
chips) was randomly drawn from a cloth bag. The surveys explained that the loss 
could be avoided through the purchase of an insurance policy. The cost of the 
insurance policy, which fully protects against the possible $10 loss, was to be 
deducted from the $80 balance. 
The surveys were administered to undergraduate classes in economic 
principles at the University of Colorado. The subjects were generally unaware of the 
concept of expected value and were not trained in it or related concepts. These 
subjects were not recruited for, and did not participate in, the English auction 
experiment. A total of 766 students were administered contingent value surveys. 
Following theoretical and empirical expositions of optimal sample design in 
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dichotomous choice contingent valuation (Cooper and Loomis, 1992; Kanninen, 
1993) posted prices were concentrated at critical points on the anticipated 
distribution: close to the expected median value ($4) and at two prices ($1, $8) above 
and below this value. Given uncertainty in the parameter values, additional 
"insurance" that the entire distribution was adequately covered was obtained by 
setting a second tier of posted prices ($6, $12), with fewer observations.3 Table 1 
shows the allocation of subjects across versions and prices. 
The CV surveys were administered to each class at the beginning of a normal 
lecture. The surveys were distributed to the class, and a verbal explanation of the 
instructions was given. To increase the saliency of the risk, the experimenter 
demonstrated the risk by drawing poker chips from a bag. The experimenter 
explained the consequences of drawing a white chip or a red chip, depending on 
whether one had an insurance policy or not. The students usually completed the 
survey within 10 minutes. 
4. Results 
The analysis of estimated WTP values for the insurance policy is divided into 
two stages. First, we evaluate the English (ENG) Auction results. This experiment 
involves real monetary transactions and an incentive compatible, demand 
revealing mechanism, so it provides a reference point for assessing the hypothetical 
contingent values for the same insurance policy. The OEQ and DCQ contingent 
values are then compared to this reference auction value and to each other. An 
additional reference value is provided by the expected value of $4 for the insurance 
policy. However, departures from risk neutrality might cause bids to deviate from 
-

3 Although the resulting range is quite wide, it is interesting to note that the highest posted price 
corresponds closely with Kanninen's "general rule-of-thumb" of limiting bids to within the 85th 
percentile of the willingness to pay distribution (Kanninen, 1995). 
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Table 1: Number of Responses to the CV Instruments by Version 
OEQ DCQ total 
students$1 $4 $6 $8 $12 
345 94 174 31 87 35 766 
the expected value of the insurance policies, but such effects are likely to be small for 
the small stakes used in these experiments. 
The top row of Table 2 and the top panel of Figure 1 present summary 
statistics and the frequency distribution for the English auction.4 The mode of the 
English auction distribution approximates the expected value of the insurance 
policy. If we replace the two missing values for the winners of the two auctions 
with the next price called (since by remaining in the auction these subjects would be 
willing to pay at least the next price called), the resulting mean value of $3.66 falls 
8% below the expected value of $4.00. This estimated mean may be an 
underestimate of the true mean which we also approximate later by fitting a 
cumulative distribution. 
The bottom row of Table 2 and the bottom panel in Figure 1 present the 
summary statistics and the frequency distribution of the OEQ values. The mean 
OEQ value of $4.58 is statistically different from $4 (t(344) =2.00, p=0.05) and exceeds 
expected values by 14.5%. The large standard deviation is due to a small number of 
very large bids obtained in the OEQ survey. Two respondents bid $40 and four bid 
$30 or more. In total, about 5% of the OEQ bids were greater than $10 (the potential 
loss is only $10), and an additional 9% of the bids were zero. These bids, as is 
typically done in CV studies, might justifiably be trimmed. By eliminating the 
4 The midpoints on the buckets in Figure 1 were chosen so that they would be consistent with the 
­incremental English auction bids and also so there would be a bucket with a midpoint of EV. The 
English auction bids are arrayed in $0.40 increments and, as per the instructions, a bid of $0.40 implies a 
WTP between $0 to $0.40. Therefore, the bucket with the midpoint $0.80 contains English Auction bids 
of $0.40, $0.80, $1.20 and $1.60; the next bucket labeled $2.40 contains bids of $2.00, $2.40, $2.80 and 
$3.20. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the English Auction and OEQ-CV Data 
n Raw Mean ($s) Std. Dev. 
English 52 3.66 1.15 
OEQCV 345 4.58 5.38 
Figure 1: Frequency Distributions 
English Auction 
60 
40 
20 
o 
Zero's $0,80 $2,40 $4,00 $5.60 $7.20 $8.80 $10.40 $12.00 >$12.80 
Open-ended Contingent Values 
60 
40 
20 
• 
o 
Zero's $0.80 $2.40 $4.00 $5.60 $7.20 $8.80 $10.40 $12.00 >$12.80 
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outlier bids that were at zero or above $10, the mean bid falls to $3.97 (s = $2.06) 
which is not significantly different from $4 (t(296) =-0.25, p=0.80). However, Figure 
1 illustrates that the OEQ responses exhibit more variability than the auction values, 
even if these outliers are ignored. In addition, it is a well known fact in 
experimental economics that decreasing incentives increases bidding variance 
(Smith and Walker, 1993a, 1993b). In other words, subject bidding error increases as 
incentives are decreased. 
Table 3 presents the data collected from the DCQ survey. The DCQ data are 
not in a form that is easily comparable to the distribution of bids obtained from the 
other methods. Dichotomous choice responses contain far less information than 
open-ended responses; to make a meaningful comparison, the open-ended 
responses must be converted to an equivalent dichotomous choice for a given price. 
We made a conversion of the OEQ data into equivalent dichotomous choices 
at the five prices assuming that respondents would have chosen to buy the 
insurance if the posted price had been less than or equal to their OEQ values. In 
making the conversion, we wanted to maintain independence in the OEQ data 
across the prices. Thus each OEQ value was allocated randomly to one of the five 
prices in a way that produced sample sizes proportional to the DCQ samples for each 
price. It was apparent, however, that the results were dependent on the random 
allocation. To get a proportion at each price that was not dependent on a particular 
allocation, 100 random allocations were used; the average proportions from these 
100 allocations are reported in the right half of Table 3. In a simple comparison, 
each of the DCQ proportions is higher than the average proportions for the OEQ 
data. Thus, a demand curve estimated from the DCQ data will be entirely to the 
right of a demand curve estimated from OEQ data. ­
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Table 3: Results from the DCQ Survey and OEQ Conversion to Dichotomous 
Choices 
Price 
DC.Q OEQ 
Total Number of 
Responses 
Proportion that 
Accepted the Posted 
Price 
Average Number of 
Observations 
Average Proportion 
that Would have 
Accepted the Posted 
Price 
$1 94 93.62% 77 88.00% 
$4 174 67.82% 143 55.92% 
$6 31 32.26% 25 16.12% 
$8 87 24.14% 71 8.43% 
$12 35 11.43% 29 4.90% 
In order to calculate the mean bid from dichotomous choice data a 
distribution must be assumed and then a maximum likelihood estimation must be 
made. From this estimation the expected value, or estimated mean WTP, can be 
calculated. Assuming a logistic distribution, which is widely employed in DCQ 
analysis, the following logit function is estimated: 
(" ") EXP( a + ,BPfice)(1)	 b b 'l'PfO a 1lty yes = --------"---­
1+ EXP( a + ,BPrice). 
It is well known that the mean, which equals the median, of this symmetric 
distribution is given by: 
-- a 
A 
(2) WTP = -",
,B 
where a and fi are estimated coefficients from Equation (1). Alternatively, under 
the assumption that only non-negative values should be considered in estimating 
mean WTP, Hanemann (1989) shows that the expected value of WTP of the logit 
­
estimation in Equation 1 is given by: 
12. 
- 1 (3) WTP = -" Ln[1 +EXP(a)]
-fJ 
In the analyses that follow, Equation (2) shall be referred to as the "median" value 
and Equation (3) will be referred to as the "non-negative mean" (Johansson, et al., 
1989; Hanemann, 1989). Approximate distributions of these values can be estimated 
using bootstrapping techniques (Park, et al., 1991). Cameron (1991) provides an 
analytical solution for the variance of the point estimate in Equation (2). 
The yes/no responses to the dichotomous choice questions were modeled 
directly, based on the proportions provided in Table 3. For the OEQ data the 
parameter estimates were averaged over each of the 100 random allocations across 
the five prices. As we are primarily concerned at this stage with distributional 
comparisons between the DCQ and the OEQ values, and since the English auction 
sample is relatively small, no attempt to maintain independence was made in the 
logit estimations of the ENG data. We simply calculated the proportion of bids that 
were at or above the threshold prices for all subjects, using each of the 52 bids as 
threshold values. We do not report the standard errors from these estimates nor do 
we perform any statistical tests that utilize them. It should be noted, however, that 
the parameter estimates remain unbiased. 
Table 4 presents the estimated logit coefficient for all three experiments. 
Likelihood ratio tests conducted for the logit equation of the average proportions 
across the 100 allocations of bid responses rejects the null hypothesis of equality 
between the DCQ and the OEQ demand equations (%2(2)=15.11, p<O.Ol). The 
specific nature of the deviations was further investigated by pooling the data and 
using binary variables to identify constant (a) and slope (fJ) effects: in a model that 
allows for both an intercept and a slope shift, the binary coefficient for a. was not 
­
significant (p=0.76) but the binary coefficient for fJ was marginally significant 
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Table 4: Estimated Logistic Functions 
OEQ-ev DCQ-ev ENGLISH 
a 
(S.E.) 
[Range] 
2.6716 
(0.3305) 
[1.9965,3.4662] 
2.6876 
(0.2744) 
5.3281 
f3 
-0.6103 -0.4771 -1.3104 
(S.E.) (0.0701) (0.0501) 
[Range} [-0.8013, -0.4725] 
X2 257.58 144.97 
[Range] [77.39,476.46] 
n 345 421 52 
Note: a, f3 ' and S.E. for OEQ are averages of 100 random allocations across the five prices. Ranges 
are the highest and lowest observations of 100 allocations. 
(p=0.08). This analysis, combined with the likelihood ratio test, would indicate that 
the DCQ and the OEQ curves diverge for prices above zero. 
Figure 2 depicts the fitted logistic demand functions estimated from ENG, 
OEQ, and DCQ values. Corresponding to the statistical analyses, it is clear that the 
demand curve derived from the DCQ version is to the right of the demand curve 
derived from the OEQ version. In comparison, the curve for the English auction 
approaches a step function, reflecting its tighter distribution around the mean 
(demand is negligible at prices above the mean bid and large at prices below the 
mean bid). 
Figure 3 depicts probability functions derived from the demand curves for the 
WTP estimates. Consistent with prior comparisons of real and hypothetical 
transactions, the distributions from the two estimated hypothetical CV versions 
(OEQ and DCQ) are much more dispersed than the distributions from the auction 
­
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Figure 2: Demand Data and Fitted Logistic Functions 
1 
4 
2 
o 0.2 . 0.4 0.6 
Proportion of Sampfe 
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60EQ 
OENG 
0.8 1
 
Figure 3: Corresponding Estimated Probability Density Functions 
468 10 12 14 
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experiment. The estimated "non-negative mean" WTP values provided in Table 5 
are shown in Figure 3 as vertical lines. Note also that the predicted mean value for 
the English auction calculated from the estimated coefficients shown in Table 4 is 
also shown as a vertical line in Figure 3. This value which is robust to alternative 
assumptions about the winners' bids is equal to $4.07, very close to the expected 
value of the insurance policy.S 
In addition to the point values for median WTP, and non-negative mean 
WTP derived from the logit parameter estimates for each version of the experiment, 
Table 5 provides the standard error and 95 percent confidence ranges for the DCQ­
CV and OEQ-CV estimates based on 1000 bootstrapped values. An empirical 
convolutions method detailed in Poe et al. (1994) is used to estimate the distribution 
of the difference of the simulated mean and median WTP distributions for the 
S Both sessions of the English auction ended at the same selling price -- $5.20. Since the winners stayed 
in at $5.20, they would have been willing to pay at least $5.60 (the next price that would have been 
called had the auction not ended). Two additional treahnents of the two winning auction bids were 
employed to test the robustness of our estimate of mean WTP. First, the two winning bids can be deleted 
from the logit analysis to provide a lower bound or "min" estimate of WTP in the English auction. As 
shown in the table below, this estimation has a downward bias on estimated WTP because we have 
information that the two observations are at least equal to $5.60. Given the tight distribution of bids 
shown for the English auction in Figure I, it is reasonable to assume that the subjects would not have 
bid more than $10 so an upper bound "max" estimate can be obtained by setting these two bids equal to 
$10. For comparison, the column "mid" shows the results reported above where the two winners' are 
assigned values of $5.60. Predicted WTP obtained from fitting the cumulative logit distribution is quite 
robust to these various assumptions, in contrast to the actual mean WTP which shows some sensitivity. 
The tight distribution of bids in the English auction suggests that mean and median estimates are 
essentially identical. We use the median estimate in the table below. 
"min" "Ill.i.d" "max" 
alpha 3.6276 5.3281 5.1089 
beta -.9144 -1.3104 1.2483 
N 50 52 52 
WTP $3.97 $4.07 $4.09 (predicted mean=alpha/beta) 
-

WTP $3.58 $3.66 $3.83 (actual mean) 
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Table 5: Analytical and Simulated Distributions of Median and Mean Values 
Analytical Simulated Simulated 
Median Median Non-negative Mean 
DE 4.38 4.38 4.51 
(S.B.) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) 
[95% CI] [3.94, 4.82] [3.93, 4.83] [4.09,4.96] 
DC 5.63 5.63 5.77 
(S.E.) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
[95% el] [5.13,6.14] [5.13,6.17] [5.27,6.33] 
Note: Analytical 'median' values for -aJ~ derived from Cameron (1991). Simulated median for -aJ~ 
and non-negative means (see text) derived from bootstrapping procedure (Park, Loomis, and Creel, 
1991). Simulated point values are averages of 100 simulations. 
elicitation formats. Applying this technique, the average difference of DCQ-CV and 
OEQ-CV distributions across the 100 simulations (each containing 1000 bootstrapped 
points) was statistically significant (p =0.0008) for the median values, and the 
corresponding difference of the non-negative mean distributions was also 
significant (p = 0.0009). That is, under the logistic distributional and other 
assumptions utilized in this analysis, the median and non-negative mean WTP 
distributions for the DCQ-CV are significantly different from the same central 
measures for the OEQ-CV format. The significance level of the difference for either 
measure never increased above 1 percent in any of the 100 simulations. 
While such statistical tests are appropriate, it might be more useful to 
compare the values that would be used for policy purposes in actual empirical 
studies. Presumably the objective of such a study would be to report a mean WTP 
value. In the case of the English auction one could use the raw mean of $3.66 
(which falls below EV by 8%) or the predicted mean of $4.07. Similarly, if an OEQ 
were employed, the raw mean of $4.58 (or a mean with outliers trimmed) would be 
used. In contrast, the mean DCQ value estimated would be either $5.63 or $5.77, 
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depending on assumptions made about negative WTP values. Regardless of 
measure used, the 95, and indeed the 99, percent confidence bounds from the DCQ 
never include the raw mean WTP values derived from the other valuation 
techniques. Thus, in a case where CV is the only method of obtaining values, this 
experiment would suggest that an OEQ version would give a relatively accurate 
measure of WTP that exceeds the expected value ($4) by 14.5%. In contrast, the DCQ 
method provides mean estimates that lie above the ENG and OEQ means by 54% 
and 23% respectively and exceed the expected value of $4 by a factor of 41%. 
5. Conclusion 
Based on the literature summarized in Section 2 and on the experimental 
results presented in Section 4, it would be difficult to reach any other conclusion 
than that hypothetical dichotomous choice responses overestimate auction values 
as well as the expected value for private goods. The experimental results presented. 
here also indicate that open-ended questions have the same direction of bias, but to 
a lesser extent. Given the conclusion from experimental economics that 
institutions matter, these results should not be surprising. 
In conclusion, this study supports the suspicions raised by previous research 
that dichotomous choice overestimates values, even in the case of private goods. 
Open-ended value questions appear to more closely approximate auction values but 
also overstate values unless outlier bids are trimmed. 
-
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Appendix A: English Auction Instructions 
Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Part I 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. You will have 
an opportunity to earn CASH through your participation in this experiment. Please 
follow these instructions carefully and do not hesitate to raise your hand if you have 
a question. You are part of a group participating in this experiment; however, you 
will not be permitted to speak with other members of the group during the 
experiment. 
You will be given a starting balance of $80 for the experiment. Any money 
left at the end of the experiment is yours to keep. Your objective, therefore, is to try 
to earn as much money as you can. There is a bag full of one hundred (100) poker 
chips: 40 red ones and 60 white ones. A chip is going to be picked randomly from 
the bag by a subject in the experiment. If a white chip is drawn then you will keep 
your $80 and you owe nothing. If a red chip is drawn, however, you will have to 
pay $10. That is, the loss of $10 will be deducted from your balance. 
Rather than taking the chance of the $10 loss, you have the option of 
purchasing an insurance policy. If you buy the insurance policy then you will not 
owe the $10 in the event that a red chip is drawn. But, you will have to pay the 
experimenter, out of your balance, for the insurance policy before the chip is drawn. 
Only one person will be able to purchase an insurance policy. The person 
who purchases the insurance policy, and the price of the policy, will be determined 
in an auction. The auction will proceed as follows: 
Each participant is given a card which is GREEN on one side and YELLOW on 
the other. (The number shown on each card is used to keep track of the auction 
results.) 
At the beginning of the auction everyone should hold their cards with the 
GREEN side facing the front of the room. 
Then one of the experimenters will start calling out prices: The prices will 
start at $0.00 and increase in $0.40 increments ($0.00, $0.40, $0.80, $1.20, etc.). Keep 
holding the GREEN side of the card towards the front of the room as long as you are 
willing to pay the price called out. .. 
However, as soon as the MAXIMUM price that you are willing to pay is 
called, and before the next higher price is called, you should turn your card so that 
the YELLOW side faces the front of the class and hold it up.. When you tum your 
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card around to YELLOW you are out of the auction and your card is DEAD. After 
the number on your card is recorded you will be asked to place DEAD cards down. 
Put your card down flat on your desk and wait until the current auction is over. 
The YELLOW side of the card tells the experimenter that you are NOT willing 
to buy the insurance policy at any price higher than the one just called. If you show 
the yellow side of the card before the auction is over it means that you have dropped 
out and you will not be able to buy the insurance policy (and will not be protected 
from a $10.00 loss if a red chip is drawn). 
The last person holding up a GREEN card gets the insurance policy for the last 
price called (the price which caused the next to last person to drop out). This 
participant will then purchase the insurance policy at the last price called (and will 
be protected from a $10.00 loss if one of the red chips is drawn from the bag). 
At the end of the auction, a volunteer subject will draw a chip from the bag 
individually for each participant. The color of the chip drawn specifically for you 
will determine whether nothing happens to your balance (white chip) or whether 
you lose $10.00 (red chip). Each drawing will be independent since after a chip is 
drawn it will be returned to the bag before the next drawing. 
-
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Appendix B: Open-Ended Question CV Survey
 
Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
This is a hypothetical experiment in the economics of decision making under 
uncertainty. We would like to know how much you would pay for an insurance 
policy to prevent the chance of a financial loss. Please read the following scenario 
carefully and do not hesitate to raise your hand if you have a question. 
Imagine that you are given a starting balance of $80 for the experiment. 
(Experiments like this have been conducted for real at C.U.). Any money left at the 
end of the experiment is yours to keep. Further, imagine that there is a bag full of 
one hundred (100) poker chips: 40 red ones and 60 white ones. A chip is going to be 
picked randomly from the bag by a student in the class. If a white chip is drawn then 
you will keep your $80 and you owe nothing. If a red chip is drawn, however, you 
will have to pay $10. That is the loss of $10 will be deducted from your balance. 
Rather than taking the chance of the $10 loss, you have the option of 
purchasing an insurance policy. If you buy the insurance policy then you will not 
owe the $10 in the event that a red chip is drawn. But, you will have to pay the 
experimenter, out of your balance, for the insurance policy before the chip is drawn. 
We would like you to write down the ~ that you would pay for the 
insurance against the $10 loss for one draw from the bag. Although this experiment 
is hypothetical, please think about the problem carefully as if you really were facing 
this $10 loss if a red chip is drawn. 
Given 40 red chips out of 100, the most that I would pay to prevent the chance of the 
$10.00 loss if a red chip is drawn is: 
dollars and cents 
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Appendix C: Dichotomous Choice Question CV Survey (price =$4) 
Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
This is a hypothetical experiment in the economics of decision making under 
uncertainty. We would like to know how much you would pay for an insurance 
policy to prevent the chance of a financial loss. Please read the following scenario 
carefully and do not hesitate to raise your hand if you have a question. 
Imagine that you are given a starting balance of $80 for the experiment. 
(Experiments like this have been conducted for real at CU.). Any money left at the 
end of the experiment is yours to keep. Further, imagine that there is a bag full of 
one hundred (100) poker chips: 40 red ones and 60 white ones. A chip is going to be 
picked randomly from the bag by a student in the class. If a white chip is drawn then 
you will keep your $80 and you owe nothing. If a red chip is drawn, however, you 
will have to pay $10. That is the loss of $10 will be deducted from your balance. 
Rather than taking the chance of the $10 loss, you have the option of 
purchasing an insurance policy. If you buy the insurance policy then you will not 
owe the $10 in the event that a red chip is drawn. But, you will have to pay the 
experimenter, out of your balance, for the insurance policy before the chip is drawn. 
Although this experiment is hypothetical, please think about the following question 
carefully as if you really were facing this $10 loss if a red chip is drawn. 
Given 40 red chips out of 100, would you be willing to pay $4.00 out of your balance 
for the insurance policy (circle one please)? 
a) Yes, I would pay $4.00 
b) No, I would Not pay $4.00 
• 
-

25.
 
WPNo ~ 
97-14 Global Hunger: The Methodologies Underlying the Official 
Statistics 
97-13 Agriculture in the Republic of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm 
Oblast of Uzbekistan 
97-12 Crop Budgets for the Westem Region of Uzbekistan 
97-11 Farmer Participation in Reforestation Incentive Programs in 
Costa Rica 
97-10 Ecotourism Demand and Differential Pricing of National 
Park Entrance Fees in Costa Rica 
97-09 The Private Provision of Public Goods: Tests of a 
Provision Point Mechanism for Funding Green Power 
Programs 
97-08 Nonrenewability in Forest Rotations: Implications for 
Economic and Ecosystem Sustainability 
97-07 Is There an Environmental Kuznets Curve for Energy? An 
Econometric Analysis 
97-06 A Comparative Analysis of the Economic Development of 
Angola and Mozamgbique 
97-05 Success in Maximizing Profits and Reasons for Profit 
Deviation on Dairy Farms 
97-04 A Monthly Cycle in Food Expenditure and Intake by 
Participants in the U.S. Food Stamp Program 
97-03 Estimating Individual Farm Supply and Demand Elasticities 
Using Nonparametric Production Analysis 
97-02 Demand Systems for Energy Forecasting: Practical 
Considerations for Estimating a Generalized Logit Model 
.. 
97-01 Climate Policy and Petroleum Depletion 
96-22 Conditions for Requiring Separate Green Payment Policies 
Under Asymmetric Information 
Author(s) 
Poleman, T.T. 
Kyle, S. and P. Chabot 
Chabot, P. and S. Kyle 
Thacher, T., D.R. Lee and J.W. 
Schelhas 
Chase, L.C., D.R. Lee, W.D. 
Schulze and D.J. Anderson 
Rose, SK, J. Clark, G.L. Poe, D. 
Rondeau and W.D. Schulze 
Erickson, J.D., D. Chapman, T. 
Fahey and M.J. Christ 
Agras, J. and D. Chapman 
Kyle, S. 
Tauer, L. and Z. Stefanides 
Wilde, P. and C. Ranney 
Stefanides, Z. and L. Tauer 
Weng, W. and T.D. Mount 
Khanna, N. and D. Chapman 
Boisvert, R.N. and J.M. Peterson 
­
To order single copies ofARME publications, write to: Publications, Department ofAgricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Warren 
Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7801. 
